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Human Dignity after Augustine’s  
Imago Dei: On the Sources and Uses  
of Two Ethical Terms
Matthew Puffer
This essay considers how Augustine’s writings on the imago Dei might shed 
light on contemporary human dignity discourse and on debates about the 
sources, uses, and translations of these two terms. Attending to developments 
in Augustine’s expositions of scriptural texts and metaphors related to the ima-
go Dei, I argue that his writings exhibit three distinct conceptions of the imago 
Dei that correspond to three accounts of the imago Dei and human dignity 
offered by Pico, Luther, and Aquinas, respectively. This plurality of meanings 
suggests that appeals to an “Augustinian” understanding of the imago Dei 
or human dignity threatens to confuse rather than resolve debates about the 
sources and uses of these terms. As long as Augustine remains an influential 
voice within the Christian tradition regarding the meaning of the imago Dei, the 
question of its translation into the secular idiom of human dignity will remain 
a live one because Augustine himself inaugurated quite diverse yet legitimate 
modes of interpreting these central tropes.
FROM GENESIS TO THE PAULINE EPISTLES TO THE HADITHS 
of Sahih al-Bukhari, the sacred texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam affirm 
that human beings were created in the image of God.1 Throughout these tra-
ditions’ respective histories, prominent figures such as Maimonides, Thomas 
Aquinas, and Ibn Arabi have made the image of God central to questions of 
religious thought and life. More recent adherents continue to discuss the image 
of God and often treat it as interchangeable with another term that many take 
to be its secular analog—namely, human dignity.2
Indeed, today it is the grammar of human dignity more than the language 
of the image of God that is in the ascendency. Pope Francis, for example, ap-
peals to the image of God and human dignity almost interchangeably, and 
yet he invokes human dignity ten times more frequently than the image of 
God both in ecclesial documents and in the public square.3 And it is not only 
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religious figures who increasingly deploy this rhetorically powerful language. 
“Human dignity” is now ubiquitous in daily speech as well as in legal, political, 
and philosophical discourse. From presidential addresses and New York Times 
op-eds to the Irish, German, and South African constitutions and International 
Criminal Court rulings, “human dignity” has emerged as a key term in the 
modern ethical-political vocabulary, raising basic questions about its sources, 
uses, and translatability.
Jürgen Habermas, for example, consistently invokes human dignity in re-
cent work on the future of biotechnology—advocating ethical limits on genetic 
engineering and enhancement technologies—as well as in explicitly legal and 
political arguments surrounding human rights. He argues that “the concept of 
‘man in the image of God’ [translates] into that of the identical dignity of all 
men that deserves unconditional respect,” and he asserts that this translation of 
religious terms into a secular idiom occurs “without emptying them through a 
process of deflation and exhaustion.”4 Of course not all philosophers and politi-
cal theorists share Habermas’s judgments about the image of God, its straight-
forward translation into human dignity, or its potential for grounding human 
rights. Analytic philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, contends that 
the “image of God is not adequate . . . for grounding natural human rights.”5 It 
might provide a basis for some value, but according to Wolterstorff, the status 
of inviolable dignity needed to ground human rights does not derive from the 
image of God but from a separate divine conferral of worth. Legal theorist 
Jeremy Waldron considers the translation question a bit more complicated. He 
recognizes that the image of God, like human dignity, has a long history and 
a wide range of meanings: “if [the image of God] is looked to as a ground [for 
human rights], [which interpretation we select] may make a considerable dif-
ference to the character of the rights theory we erect on its foundation.”6 That 
is, depending on what the image of God names, its moral and legal entailments 
will vary considerably.
Still other scholars are far less sanguine about the utility of human dignity, 
whether for bioethics, human rights, or the public sphere. Ruth Macklin fa-
mously argues that “dignity is a useless concept,” and Stephen Pinker similarly 
perceives invocations of human dignity as a ploy manifesting the “stupidity” 
of cultural “theocons.”7 On the other hand, many Thomists, humanists, Kan-
tians, and legal scholars consider an affirmation of human dignity essential 
for precisely those debates in which Macklin and Pinker dismiss it.8 Theorists 
and advocates on both sides of a range of contemporary social and political 
 issues—from abortion, assisted suicide, and genetic experimentation to torture, 
immigration policy, and reparations––invoke human dignity to buttress their 
respective claims and positions.9 In light of the protean appeal to human dignity 
on numerous sides of deeply contested questions, legal scholar Christopher 
McCrudden asks: “Does this demonstrate that the concept is hopelessly vague 
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and excessively prone to manipulation? Or does the existence of dignity argu-
ments on both sides of controversial debates simply demonstrate the complex-
ity of moral argument?”10 Like McCrudden, larger political institutions are 
beginning to wrestle with the questions raised by the multiplicity of sources 
and uses of human dignity. Signaling its importance for understanding our 
world today, the US President’s Council on Bioethics, the British Academy, 
and the Union Académique Internationale have recently commissioned con-
ferences and published volumes on the question of human dignity, consulting 
scholars and practitioners across diverse fields and disciplines.11 Sociologists of 
religion from Emile Durkheim to Mary Douglas, Peter Berger, and Hans Joas 
remind us that it is contestations such as these surrounding the genesis and 
ends of human dignity that disclose just what a culture constructs as the sacred, 
demarcating the boundaries and essence of the human condition. Everyone 
cares about human dignity today, even if we mean different things and we care 
in different ways.
On a more quotidian level, the manifest disagreements about what human 
dignity entails raise questions about the extent to which theorists who invoke 
human dignity are talking about the same thing. Most often, invocations of 
human dignity resemble one of three philosophical conceptions. Some turn to 
ancient antecedents—e.g., Aristotle, Seneca, or Cicero—for whom semnotes or 
dignitas has to do with virtue, self-regulation, or the conferral of and respect 
for an honorable social status.12 Many others invoke Kant’s Menschenwürde, the 
inviolable worth derivative of the special human capacity for self-legislation 
(Autonomie) in accordance with reason.13 Most often, however, the meaning 
resembles John Stuart Mill’s more liberal construal of autonomy, the liberty to 
act in accordance with a life plan one chooses for oneself.14 The contemporary 
deprivatization of religion further muddies the waters as appeals to these three 
different meanings of dignity overlap to varying degrees with concepts from 
diverse religious and cultural traditions—like the image of God, Islamic con-
ceptions of fitra, or South African notions of ubuntu.15 It is hardly surprising, 
then, that the meaning of human dignity in present-day religious, philosophi-
cal, and legal discourses varies greatly depending upon who appeals to it and 
the purposes to which they put it.
In response to this manifest diversity of concerns and meanings, this essay 
seeks both to further complicate and to clarify the various interpretative issues 
surrounding historical understandings of the image of God and human dignity. 
I illumine the uses and translations of these terms by showing that several 
meanings were already present in one influential source of ethical thought and 
by tracing their development. For much of Latin Christendom—from Boethius 
and Aquinas to Martin Luther and Jonathan Edwards—Augustine of Hippo was 
an, if not the, authoritative voice, second only to their sacred scriptures. And, 
in many debates that have shaped Roman Catholic and Protestant thought, 
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much has depended on which side could most persuasively claim Augustine’s 
authoritative legacy. With an eye toward assessing Augustine’s influence upon 
later rival interpretations of the image of God and human dignity, this essay 
offers a fine-grained account of developments within Augustine’s own scrip-
tural exegesis, highlighting three distinct interpretations of the image of God 
that are evident as his understanding evolves throughout his writings. This 
account complicates appeals to a single purported “Augustinian” conception 
of the image of God by disclosing not one meaning but three. Thus, the story 
I tell about the image of God in Augustine’s thought in no way resolves, but 
rather anticipates and mirrors, debates about the sources and uses of human 
dignity that emerged in the earlier modern period and echo even more today. 
Instead, my account clarifies how each of three prevalent, competing meanings 
of human dignity finds its theological analog in a version of the image of God 
already present in Augustine’s writings. Therefore, I argue, as long as Augustine 
remains an influential voice within the Christian tradition regarding the mean-
ing of the image of God, the question of its translation into the secular idiom 
of human dignity will remain a live one.
Three Versions of the Imago Dei in Augustine’s Writings
Much of Augustine’s Confessions is devoted to disavowing Manichaean under-
standings of evil, the image of God, and justice.16 In Book 6 he confesses that, 
at the time of his conversion from Manichaeism to Christianity in 386 CE, the 
bishop of Milan, Ambrose, was preaching on a longstanding interest of Augus-
tine’s, the image of God.17 As a Manichean “hearer,” Augustine learned from 
fellow followers of Mani that the Hebrew Bible embraced by Christians as the 
Old Testament included in it absurd doctrines, including the ascription to God 
of a human form. This, Mani said, was the implication of Genesis 1:26–27: “Let 
us make humankind to our image, according to our likeness. . . . So, God cre-
ated humankind to his image, to the image of God he created them, male and 
female he created them.” As a Manichee, Augustine had learned not to trust 
the Hebrew Bible for numerous reasons, and the ascription of a human form 
to God was paramount. After his exposure to the Alexandrian Neoplatonism of 
Ambrose and his conversion from North African Manichaean Christianity to 
Catholic Christianity, however, Augustine’s vigorous affirmation of the image 
of God became a central point of contention in the new convert’s polemical 
interactions with Manichaean elites such as Faustus. Subsequently, interpreta-
tions of scriptural references to the image of God became an enduring inter-
est that slowly deepened over the next four and a half decades of Augustine’s 
teaching, preaching, and writing, including five major expositions of Genesis 1 
in particular.18 In the end, more than eight hundred explicit references to the 
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image and likeness of God would be inscribed across more than 150 of Augus-
tine’s letters, sermons, and treatises.19
Three distinct conceptions of the image of God emerge in three successive 
periods of Augustine’s forty-five-year writing career. In Augustine’s early writ-
ings (386–400 CE), he presents the image of God as something extrinsic to 
the human, as the Son who is the proper object of human love. In the middle 
writings (401–412 CE), he re-presents the image of God as something intrinsic 
but not inherent to the human, as a natural capacity for loving God that can 
be lost and regained. In his later writings (413–430 CE), Augustine eventually 
comes to see the image of God as an intrinsic and inherent capacity for loving 
God that is persistent and nonadventitious to human nature. In what follows, 
I show how these three distinct meanings that Augustine gives to the image of 
God slowly emerge out of a practice of continual revision in his theological 
exegesis of scripture.
As Augustine explains to Marcellinus—the Roman official and friend to 
whom Augustine dedicated his magnum opus, The City of God—“I write as I 
develop, and I develop as I write.”20 Through careful attention to developments 
in his writings about the image of God, I demonstrate how the initial concep-
tion of the image of God evident in Augustine’s early writings gradually evolves 
into the quite distinct understandings presented in the middle and later writ-
ings. More specifically, subsequent to Augustine’s early interpretive framework, 
I argue that seven developments in Augustine’s theological exegesis of specific 
scriptural texts and metaphors account for the distinct accounts of the image 
of God in the middle and later writings.
Augustine’s Early Interpretive Framework
Three features of Augustine’s early moral reasoning provide a useful back-
ground against which subsequent developments can be cast in sharp relief. 
First, Augustine’s initial interpretations of the image of God owe much to the 
preposition “to” (ad) in the Genesis 1:26–27 text, “God created humankind to 
the image and likeness of God” (ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei).21 From his 
first writings in 386 CE until Book 13 of the Confessions (c. 400 CE), Augustine 
repeatedly emphasizes that human beings are created with a particular relation 
to the image of God. He does not assert that the human person is the image 
of God, or even that humans are created in the image of God. Rather, the 
human is created toward the image of God. The image of God is an extrinsic 
telos toward which the human agent orients his or her love. His consistent 
emphasis in these writings is that human beings were created with a disposition 
or orientation toward the image of God, where the image and likeness of God 
is understood to be the second person of the Trinity, the Son of God, consub-
stantial with and coequal to the Father. It is the Son, qua image of God, toward 
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whom the human was oriented, dispositionally, in creation. Augustine learned 
this interpretation of Genesis 1:26 from Ambrose, who synthesized New Testa-
ment texts that proclaim that Jesus Christ is the image of God (Col 1:15 and 2 
Cor 4:4) with a virtue-framed conception of the progressive renewal of human 
nature toward God’s image. In this early period of Augustine’s development, he 
too frames the moral progress made by an individual believer in the grammar 
of Neoplatonic ascent, allowing, at least for a time, for the retention of residual 
Manichean commitments regarding the attainability of perfection in this life.
For roughly the first decade after his conversion to Catholic Christianity—
five years as a layperson and five as a priest in the North African town of Hippo 
Regius—Augustine remained convinced that those who follow a truly virtuous 
way of life attain moral perfection in this life.22 In such early works as On the 
Morals of the Catholic Church (387–89 CE), On Genesis: A Refutation of the Man-
ichees (389 CE), and On the Sermon on the Mount (393 CE), this notion of prog-
ress [profectus] is signified figurally by seven steps that correspond to seven days 
of creation and to seven beatitudes (where an eighth day or beatitude represents 
an octave, or a reprise of the first). Those who are carried upward by their ever 
more rightly ordered love for the Son, the image of God, find their corrupt 
natures are healed and their virtues are strengthened, giving them ever greater 
victory and control over the fallen and rebellious concupiscent libido. In these 
texts and many others from this early period, Augustine presents the moral 
life in terms of two possible trajectories. Depending on the willing orientation 
of one’s love toward the object(s) of its enjoyment, one is either ascending or 
descending in one’s nature, knowledge, and love.
Second, during this early period, Augustine repeatedly interprets these two 
trajectories in terms of three metaphorical distinctions that he finds in Pau-
line texts that refer to the image of God—the “old human / new human” of 
Colossians 3 and Ephesians 4; the “image of the earthly human / image of 
the heavenly human” of 1 Corinthians 15; and the “outer human / inner hu-
man” of 2 Corinthians 4. The synthesis of these three metaphorical distinc-
tions is not peculiar to Augustine. In fact, it replicates the exegesis of Faustus, 
the Manichean Elect (or perfecti) with whom Augustine became quite familiar 
during the formative decade that Augustine lived as a “zealous [Manichean] 
hearer.”23 Faustus writes, “For according to the Apostle there are two men, one 
of whom he sometimes calls the outer man, generally the earthly, sometimes 
too the old man; the other he calls the inner or heavenly or new man.”24 Like 
Faustus’s Paul, Augustine’s synthesis of the old/new, outer/inner, and earthly/
heavenly distinctions indexes a single dichotomy, but influenced as he is by the 
Neoplatonism of Ambrose and others in Milan, it is a binary not so much of 
knowledge as of will; not gnosis, but orientation or disposition. Thus, all three 
scriptural metaphorical distinctions signify the same twofold possibility regard-
ing one’s ascending or descending trajectory, with the choice dependent on 
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one’s disposition, the voluntary orientation of one’s love. The weight of rightly 
ordered love of God and all things in God—including both higher goods (i.e., 
invisible, intelligible, eternal, immutable, incorporeal goods) as well as lower 
ones (i.e., visible, sensible, temporal, mutable, corporeal goods)—carries one 
toward God, an ascent, whereas the disordered love for lower goods carries one 
away from God, a descent.
Third, Augustine’s exposition of the four stages of humanity in his 395 CE 
Romans commentaries perceives in Paul a soteriological framework that ef-
fectively displaces the earlier, more libertarian conception in which persons 
freely choose whether to ascend the seven gradual steps of virtuous perfection. 
Augustine now interprets Paul as providing a four-stage framework: (1) before 
the law (ante legem), (2) under the law (sub lege), (3) under grace (sub gratia), and 
(4) in peace (in pace).25 These four stages are separated by moments of instanta-
neous transition and transformation—stage one ends with the giving of the law, 
regeneration marks the transition from stage two to stage three, and the general 
resurrection of the dead ushers in the eternal peace of stage four. Within this 
newly discovered framework, the renewal or renovation toward the image of 
God, previously spread across seven gradual steps of ascent, becomes confined 
to the third stage of human existence sub gratia, where only the regenerate elect 
have the capacity to resist the concupiscent libido. Most significant for our pur-
poses, the four-stage framework introduces new interpretive possibilities both 
for the image of God and for the metaphorical distinctions that Augustine, under 
the residual influence of Faustus, had previously collapsed into two orientations 
of the human will.
With these three features of Augustine’s early thought in view—(1) the im-
age of God identifies the Son toward whom the human is oriented; (2) the 
old/new, outer/inner, and earthly/heavenly scriptural metaphorical distinctions 
refer to two orientations of will; and (3) the reframing of salvation history from 
seven gradual steps to four distinct stages—we are better positioned to appreci-
ate a series of subsequent developments in Augustine’s understanding of the 
image of God.
Seven Developments in Augustine’s Scriptural Imagination
Gerald Bonner once wrote of Augustine, “It is reasonable to regard his opin-
ions on most theological issues as having been established by the time he 
became sole bishop of Hippo in 396.”26 On the contrary, through careful at-
tention to Augustine’s theological exegesis, I demonstrate seven developments 
in Augustine’s evolving understanding of the image of God, all of which occur 
after 396 CE. Earlier, I argued that Augustine’s early writings (386–400 CE) 
depict the image of God as an extrinsic telos—the image of God is the Son of 
God toward whom human dispositions were rightly oriented in creation and 
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toward whom fallen human beings ought to reorient their loves. In what fol-
lows, I examine Augustine’s writings from 400–430 CE, with special attention 
to several developments in his interpretive judgments about scriptural texts 
and metaphors, including the meaning of the image of God and whether this 
image might be lost.
First, around 400 CE, after two abandoned commentaries on Genesis, Au-
gustine makes two important revisions that anticipate and precipitate addi-
tional related changes. These two developments are apparent in his exegesis of 
Genesis 1 and 1 Corinthians 11:7 in Confessions and in On the Works of Monks, 
respectively. Augustine’s third exposition of Genesis 1:26–27 in just over a de-
cade, Book 13 of the Confessions reconsiders the implications where the human 
is said to be created “to our image” and “according to our likeness.” Augustine’s 
first exegesis that attends to the plural pronouns coincides with a new judgment 
that the “ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei” refers to the Trinity rather than 
solely to the Son. Hereafter, Augustine no longer contends that human beings 
are created with a disposition toward the Son—where the Son is understood 
as the perfect image and likeness of the Father. Instead we read that human 
beings are created toward the image of the Trinity.27 Arriving only in the final 
few pages of Confessions, what this will come to mean for Augustine is anything 
but clear at this point.
Within a year of concluding his Confessions, Augustine wrestles for the first of 
many times with the apparent, literal, and spiritual meanings of 1 Corinthians 
11:7. In On the Works of Monks (401 CE), Augustine first quotes this text—man 
is the image and glory of God but woman is the glory of man—and he does so 
as a warrant for a second important revision. 1 Corinthians 11:7 is important 
to Augustine because it is the one scriptural text that explicitly states that a hu-
man being is the image of God (or, rather, it is the only text that does so that 
is not also explicitly referencing Jesus Christ). At the same time, however, it 
attributes the image of God to the male as opposed to the female human being. 
Here, Augustine claims for the first time not that the human being is created 
toward the image of God (ad imaginem Dei), but rather that the human being is 
the image of God (est imago Dei).28
Prior to around 400 CE, Augustine had interpreted Genesis 1, Colossians 3, 
Ephesians 4, 1 Corinthians 15, Romans 8, and 2 Corinthians 4 within a reading 
that affirmed the Son is the image of God—the image toward whom the human 
was oriented in creation. After 400 CE—when his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 
11:7 coincides with the Trinitarian rendering of Genesis 1:26–27—Augustine 
consistently affirms that the individual human being is the image of God, albeit 
still only with respect to the rational part of the human soul. Augustine’s inter-
pretation of the image of God shifts at this point, from an image of God signi-
fying an extrinsic telos toward which the human being was created and toward 
which the human progresses, to an intrinsic referent within the human itself.
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Subsequent developments manifest a continuing evolution from 401–412 
CE. By arguing that the human being is the image of the Trinity, Augustine 
creates new difficulties when it comes to sustaining his earlier interpretive 
decisions regarding other texts, particularly those that invoke the term “im-
age” in relation to the Son. For example, in a third revision, Augustine 
reinterprets “conformed to the image of his Son” (Rom 8:29). No longer 
is this a reference to moral progress through virtuous renewal in this life. 
Rather, he asserts that the image of the Son here references the resurrected 
spiritual body, a referent that comes to be shared with the “image of the 
heavenly human” of 1 Corinthians 15:49. Recall that previously, in On the 
Morals of the Catholic Church, being “conformed to the image of the Son” 
and the “image of the heavenly human” had been considered synonymous 
with the “new human” of Colossians 3 and Ephesians 4 and with the “inner 
human” of 2 Corinthians 4.
Both of the latter metaphors come to be reinterpreted as well. A fourth 
revision involves relocating the “old human / new human” of Colossians 3 and 
Ephesians 4 from its prior referent, a binary of concupiscent descent or virtuous 
ascent, to a new referent—namely, the moment of regeneration or conversion, 
from sub lege to sub gratia, in Augustine’s four-stage framework. A fifth revi-
sion mirrors this development when Augustine relocates the “earthly human / 
heavenly human” distinction of 1 Corinthians 15:49 from its prior referent—
the same dichotomy of descent or ascent—to the moment of transition from 
this life to the next, from sub gratia to in pace. Collectively, these developments 
serve to disaggregate the three metaphorical distinctions that Augustine had 
previously synthesized. The “old human / new human” and “earthly human / 
heavenly human” metaphors now index regeneration and resurrection, respec-
tively—two distinct transitions in the four stages of humanity.
Augustine’s sixth significant revision emerges out of his exegesis of 2 Cor-
inthians 3 in On the Spirit and the Letter (412–413 CE) and has to do with the 
large question of whether or not the image of God is lost in the Fall. In his 
early works, from 386 to 400 CE, Augustine was able to write of a lost disposi-
tion. For example, in Against Adimantus (396 CE) Augustine is quite clear that 
the disposition toward the image and likeness of God, one’s orientation to the 
Son, can be lost. But where the image of God remained an extrinsic telos, the 
meaning of losing the image of God was more akin to losing one’s way than to 
losing something intrinsic. From 400 to 412 CE, in the years he composes The 
Literal Meaning of Genesis, all of this changes, and it is in this period and in this 
text more than any other that we find Augustine’s strongest and most repeated 
assertions that the image of God is indeed lost in the Fall and only restored in 
regeneration.29 After the Fall and before regeneration, sub lege, the image of 
God is not only deformed or tarnished but destroyed. The image of God is thus 
totally lost for unregenerate humanity.
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But this stark conviction soon comes under further scrutiny and revision. 
Augustine first entertains an alternative hypothesis—that the image of God 
might not be lost in the Fall—somewhat tentatively in an exegesis of 2 Corin-
thians 3 in On the Spirit and the Letter. There the concern is Paul’s discussion 
of the law of Moses in relation to God’s covering and lifting of the veil. In the 
same year, in 413 CE, Sermon 362 and Letters 147 and 148 all return to this 
passage from Paul, arguing that the “image transformed from glory to glory” 
(2 Cor 3:18) is not a recovery of what was lost but an uncovering of that which 
had been veiled. From this point forward in Augustine’s writings, including his 
final Retractiones, Augustine cites 2 Corinthians 3:18 as a warrant for this revised 
interpretation—the image of God is not lost in the Fall.30
The most significant implication of this sixth revision, the new conviction 
that the image of God is not lost but only veiled, is that it leads to identifying 
the image of God with an inherent, persistent capacity for the contemplation 
of God. This capacity of the rational soul, Augustine tells us, persists even in 
those for whom this capacity is not empowered or activated by the divine grace 
and love of the Holy Spirit. Three times in De trinitate 14, Augustine repeats 
that the image of God is this capacity in human nature for participation in God 
as opposed to the active participation itself.31 The capacity is intrinsic to and 
inherent in human nature such that it is not lost even when this capacity is not 
activated, not operationalized by God’s love as the Holy Spirit. Thus, the old, 
unregenerate, sub lege human (of Col 3 and Eph 4) is just as much the image of 
God as is the new, regenerate, sub gratia human. The image of God is no longer 
something extrinsic to the human toward which it is oriented, as it was from 
386-400 CE; nor is the image of God something lost in the Fall and restored 
only to those who are reformed or remade as God’s image by regeneration and 
the mind’s inspiration, as it was from 401–412 CE. Rather, after 413 CE the 
image of God is persistently present in the nature of the rational soul itself as an 
intrinsic capacity, regardless of whether the soul willingly exercises this capacity 
and participates in the divine self-love.
In a seventh revision Augustine returns to 1 Corinthians 11:7—man is the 
image and glory of God but woman is the glory of man—a provocative text 
that apparently excludes the female from reflecting the divine image. As noted 
earlier, Augustine’s figural reading of 1 Corinthians 11:7 interprets the male 
and female as signifying two parts of the one human. The development worth 
highlighting here is more of a series of revisions with a trajectory as opposed to 
a single development. Initially, Augustine takes the male to signify the mind and 
the female to signify all that is concupiscent in human nature—the normative 
implication being that the male is to exercise dominion over the female, just as 
the rational soul exercises dominion over its irrational elements and the body, 
as the human does over the nonrational animal and as Christ does over the 
Church.32 Augustine’s second reading promotes the female from signifying all 
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of the concupiscent elements in human nature, including the material body, to 
signifying only the nonrational parts of the soul, thereby excluding the physical 
body.33 Instead, the serpent takes over that lowest signifying function previ-
ously assigned to the female. In a third reading, Augustine yet again relocates 
the distinction of 1 Corinthians 11:7 so that both male and female signify the 
mind—the inner human (of the inner/outer distinction from 2 Corinthians 4)—
but in such a way that only the male signifies the mind’s contemplation of 
wisdom whereas the female signifies the mind’s active knowledge that manages 
temporal things.34 As such, the female in 1 Corinthians 11:7 no longer signifies 
the nonrational part of the soul held in common with the beasts but rather an 
aspect of the rational portion of the soul considered unique to the human, albeit 
a decisively subordinate aspect.35
Human Dignity after Augustine’s Imago Dei
The developments mapped in the foregoing present a gradual unfolding in 
Augustine’s interpretation of the image of God. Scriptural distinctions and 
metaphors that initially overlap in a single, simpler conception of the moral 
life eventually fold outward and migrate, taking on different meanings within a 
larger four-stage soteriological framework. The unfolding starts from a vision 
of the image of God in which all of the texts initially considered were located 
within a framework of virtuous ascent toward perfection: The ad imaginem et 
similitudinem (of Gen 1), the “image of the heavenly human” (of 1 Cor 15), and 
being “conformed to the image of the Son” (of Rom 8) all refer to the telos 
toward which the rightly ordered rational soul is oriented. Here, the image of 
God is extrinsic to the human—the Son is the image of God toward which the 
human disposition aims, to which human love conforms itself, and to which 
the weight of its love carries it. Within this framework of virtuous ascent, Au-
gustine renders several of scripture’s metaphorical distinctions in terms of two 
potential dispositions of will. From old to new (Eph 4, Col 3), from earthly 
to heavenly (1 Cor 15), from outer to inner (2 Cor 4)—a reorientation of will 
distinguishes those who remain enslaved to concupiscence from those who are 
making progress on the path of a gradual perfection, a perfection attainable in 
this life through the pursuit of the moral life of which the Catholic Christian 
faith is the chief exponent.
Gradually, Augustine revisits the scriptural texts’ distinctions between old and 
new, outer and inner, earthly and heavenly, and all begin to unfold outward onto 
a larger framework. The scriptural “old human / new human” distinction (Col 3 
and Eph 4) and the “earthly human / heavenly human” distinction (1 Cor 15) no 
longer reference a gradual growth but now index, instead, two different instanta-
neous transitions: regeneration and resurrection. As the various texts unfold, they 
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disclose not one image of God but two. First, the image of the Trinity refers to a 
capacity of the mind that persists across all four stages of human existence. Thus, 
the image of God is no longer a telos toward which one progresses, nor is it lost 
in the Fall. Second, the “image of the Son” (Rom 8:29), having been displaced 
from its prior identification with Genesis 1:26, comes to reference the spiritual 
body of the resurrection that only the elect will inherit in pace.
Developments in Augustine’s theological exegesis of the image of God af-
ford a new vantage from which to offer a few critical observations about the 
uses of the language of human dignity in relation to the imago Dei. I noted at 
the outset both the variety of sources and diversity of meanings operative in 
human dignity discourse—e.g., Seneca, Kant, and Mill—and also several com-
peting judgments regarding the translatability of the image of God into the 
language of human dignity—e.g., Habermas, Wolterstorff, and Waldron. The 
three different interpretations of the image of God evident in three periods 
of Augustine’s writings—first, an extrinsic telos; second, something intrinsic 
that can be lost; and, third, an intrinsic capacity that persists—allow for a more 
complex assessment of the uses of these terms. Given the variety of interpreta-
tions of both human dignity and the image of God, we must judge Habermas’s 
claim to be ill-informed—the image of God does not simply translate directly as 
human dignity without loss or remainder. Waldron is nearer to the mark. Any 
translation of the image of God as human dignity will need to specify which 
meaning of each term that one has in view. As long as invocations of the image 
of God and human dignity leave the diverse historical sources and meanings of 
these terms unspecified, they will fall victim to the critiques rightly advanced 
by Macklin, Pinker, and others.
At the same time, labeling a particular account of the image of God “Augus-
tinian” does little to specify which account of human dignity one has in view. 
Consider, for example, three major heirs of Augustine’s legacy in the Medieval 
and Reformation periods who respectively exhibit Augustine’s three interpre-
tations of the image of God with quite different implications for the meaning 
of human dignity. Augustine’s first interpretation finds an analog in the Italian 
Renaissance humanist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola; his second, in the one-
time Augustinian priest, Martin Luther; and his third, in the great Medieval 
synthesizer of Augustine and Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas. These figures reflect 
different strands of Augustine’s legacy in interesting and complicated ways.
In his “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” Pico shows that he, like the early 
Augustine, drank deeply from the casks of Neoplatonic thought: “Let us disdain 
things of earth . . . putting behind us all the things of this world, hasten to that 
court beyond the world, closest to the most exalted Godhead. . . . Let us emu-
late their dignity and glory. And, if we will it, we shall be inferior to them in 
nothing. . . . If we burn with love for the Creator only, his consuming fire will 
quickly transform us into the flaming likeness of the Seraphim.”36 The dignity 
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of man for Pico is thus not something intrinsic but a particularly high—indeed, 
god-like—rank or status to which humans may aspire. What is unique about 
human beings is not that they have this dignity but that through the liberal arts 
they are capable of striving toward and eventually attaining its likeness. In this 
respect, the “dignity” spoken of in Pico’s “Oration” is analogous to the image 
of God in Augustine’s early writings from 386 to 400 CE. It is not what we are 
by nature or something we inherently possess but rather a task, an aspiration, 
an image into which we as indeterminate beings strive to make ourselves.
In his 1535 Lectures on Genesis, Martin Luther mirrors Augustine’s second 
account of the image of God as intrinsic but not inherent, as something lost but 
potentially restored. This is hardly surprising given Luther’s indebtedness to Au-
gustine’s The Literal Meaning of Genesis (401–412 CE), in which this interpreta-
tion is most pronounced. Correlating dignity to the image of God, Luther writes,
Attention should therefore be given to the text before us in which the Holy 
Spirit dignifies the nature of man in such a glorious manner . . . made accord-
ing to the image and likeness of God. . . . What is that image of God? . . . 
Augustine has much to say in his explanation of this passage, particularly in 
his book On the Trinity. Moreover, the remaining doctors in general follow 
Augustine . . . they contribute very little toward the correct explanation of 
the image of God. . . . I am not sure that they are very useful. . . . I am afraid 
that since the loss of this image through sin we cannot understand it to any 
effect. . . . We cannot have an adequate knowledge of what that image of God 
was which was lost through sin in Paradise.37
According to Luther, the “image and likeness of God” of Genesis 1 indexes 
the peculiar dignity of pre-Fallen human nature. Rejecting the later exposi-
tion in De trinitate, wherein Augustine argues that the image of God is never 
lost, Luther favors an interpretation consonant with The Literal Meaning of 
Genesis—the image of God was intrinsic to the human as created but was lost 
through sin. It is not difficult to see how this conception of the image of God 
corresponds to less stable notions of human dignity in which even basic rights 
might be forfeited or lost by an individual’s sin or gross violations of justice. 
If human dignity grounds rights to life, liberty, freedom of religion, and the 
prohibition of torture, but a guilty verdict (e.g., in cases of first-degree murder, 
crimes against humanity, or treason) might forfeit or invalidate such rights, 
this corresponds to a view that human dignity might be intrinsic to those who 
possess it but does not inhere for those who violate some moral obligation. In 
this account, human dignity is not inalienable or absolute; like the image of 
God, it can be lost.
Aquinas’s account of the image of God corresponds to Augustine’s later 
interpretation advanced in De trinitate. Aquinas argues that the image of God 
in the human is the rational soul’s natural capacity for judgment, choice, and 
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action in accordance with that choice. According to Thomist ethicist Jean Por-
ter, this account explains why “torture is an assault on human dignity” and 
ought, for this reason, to be absolutely prohibited: “The good of the soul, the 
integrity of the image of God within the individual, his or her capacities for 
faith, hope, and love—no considerations of personal or national security, nor 
even the possibility of widespread loss of life, can justify an assault on these.”38 
Torture is thus a violation of human dignity because it attempts to undermine 
an agent’s rational judgment, choice, and action, no matter the moral state of 
the accused—it assaults the very capacity that is the image of God.39
Pico, Luther, and Thomas therefore present three rival versions of human 
dignity that correspond to distinct interpretations of the image of God, each 
with an antecedent in one of three periods of Augustine’s writing career. Al-
though each figure inherits a different interpretation of the image of God, each 
has a legitimate claim to the “Augustinian” moniker. Similarly, the interpretive 
development within Augustine’s writings on the image of God suggests that a 
posture of critical openness is appropriate for “Augustinians” of various stripes 
today. Furthermore, Augustine’s praxis of critical engagement with his sacred 
texts presents an opportunity where contemporary translations of the image 
of God into the grammar of human dignity are concerned. Namely, we might 
anticipate developments beyond Augustine in contemporary understandings of 
human dignity where Jews, Christians, or Muslims take into consideration texts 
highlighting ethical or theological facets of the image of God that Augustine 
elides—e.g., Genesis 9.6, Colossians 1:15, and 2 Corinthians 4:4. Augustine’s 
own evolution in conversation with his scriptures suggests that he would wel-
come critical reassessment of his own writings in light of such texts.
Regarding such developments, a letter to Hillary in 427 CE, near the end of 
Augustine’s life, is instructive for the remarkable self-awareness it exhibits: “I 
should wish no one to embrace all of my teaching. . . . I have not always held 
to the same views. Rather I believe I developed . . . while writing. We can have 
good hope for someone if the last day of this life finds him still developing.”40 
Augustine exhorted his parishioners likewise to “always develop” (semper pro-
fice).41 As Christian ethicists today develop critical and constructive accounts 
of the sources and uses of human dignity, we have much to learn from the ways 
that contemporary moral discourse continues to fashion human dignity after 
Augustine’s imago Dei.
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